Federation: signed data exchange between public health laboratories
When a surveillance signal crosses laboratory boundaries, the receiving lab needs to trust it without trusting the sending lab's database. Here's the cryptography that makes that possible.
Trust the signature, not the sender's database
A surveillance signal that leaves one laboratory and lands at another, or at a state or federal partner, is sealed with a hybrid signature (Ed25519 plus the post-quantum ML-DSA-65 algorithm) before it travels. The receiving party verifies that seal against a known partner's public key from a trust registry, so it can confirm the data wasn't altered in transit without needing to trust the originating lab's own infrastructure.
This reuses the same sealing approach already built for chain-of-custody records, rather than inventing a separate signed-package format for surveillance data specifically.
What this is not
This is point-to-point, signed exchange between known, registered partners, each in their own isolated database or schema, not a shared pool that multiple laboratories' data lands in. A laboratory chooses which partners it trusts (provisional, trusted, or revoked) and what capabilities it shares with each one.
See it in your laboratory's context.
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